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ABSTRACT  
Can financial crises bring constitutional change? Has Greece become a prominent 
example? Over eight years into recession and having undergone several programmes of 
fiscal adjustment, Greece is gradually experiencing an institutional change. This change, 
which takes place informally rather than formally, is affecting state institutions, 
primarily its parliament, as well as the executive and the courts. Everyday practice, 
political or otherwise, has changed the norms, vital checks and balances and has brought 
about a new ethos to our Constitution. With this paper, I aim to explore the idea of 
constitutional change and to connect it primarily to parliamentary and judicial activity 
after the Memoranda. How have state institutions reacted to the crisis? How do external 
players interplay with local institutions and interests? Will this crisis have a longer-term 
impact on the country, beyond its economic recovery?  
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1. Introduction  
Can financial crises bring change? Has Greece become a prominent example? Were one 
to describe what the country has been going through over the past crisis years, one 
would need to resort to the language of constitutional law, particularly to the notion of 
constitutional change. The latter term, when applied in the financial crisis context, could 
help us see the dynamic relationship between crises and constitutions. In the Greek 
case, constitutional change could aid us navigate the impact of the crisis on core state 
institutions. For the purposes of this paper, the scope of our study will be limited 
primarily to national parliaments and courts, particularly to see whether and how the 
financial crisis since the 2010 bailout programme to present has distorted their function 
and role in the crisis-hit state. And vice-versa, how they have reacted themselves to the 
crisis and the challenges posed.  
We should keep in mind, though, one thing. Institutional deterioration had predated the 
debt crisis in Greece. In fact, it may have even caused it. Thus, a critical question to ask 
is whether the debt crisis was the cause or the trigger of constitutional change in Greece.     
 
2. Constitutional change and the Case of Greece  
Constitutions may change in two ways, formally and informally. Formal or de jure change 
happens through the revision process, while informal or de facto change may take place 
through the practice of a variety of players. Formal constitutional change may be a long 
and hard process, depending on the rigidity of the constitution and the political context. 
Constitutional rigidity may help constitutions last longer but it may also present 
obstacles to the adaptability of a constitution, especially during crises. On the other 
hand, de facto constitutional change may take place drastically, with the interplay of 
multiple factors.  
In fact, a number of factors have been cited in literature (Oliver and Fusaro (2011) as the 
principal drivers of constitutional change: the people, the courts, governments & their 
leaders and supra-national institutions. Therefore, constitutional change, be it formal or 
informal, may be the result of acts of parliaments (laws), courts (case-law), the executive 
or the people directly (referenda). Additionally, external factors or players, besides 
internal ones, may drive this change. Supranational or even ad hoc institutions, acting 
beyond the state, may influence the language and development of constitutions.  
The Greek case, thus, should be examined in this framework. Constitutional change, its 
type, scale and frequency could be attributed to both the character of the constitution 
and the variety of players influencing it (Smith 2003). Due to its rigidity (Contiades and 
Tassopoulos 2013b), the Greek constitution has been formally revised2 only three times 
during the past forty five years of the metapolitefsi era since 1974,  the post-junta period 
that signified transition and sweeping reform of Greek political institutions (Kalyvas 
2015), with the process of a fourth revision recently initiated, in February 2019. 
Moreover, the country’s European Union (EU) accession in the early 1980s has brought 
                                                     
2 See article 110 of the Greek Constitution, concerning the amendment procedure. In addition to qualified 
majorities, the Constitution sets a strict 5-year time limit before its next revision.  
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a de jure constitutional change, with the steady influence of EU legislation and case law 
on the Greek legal order3. In a ‘shared sovereignty’ era (Tsoukalis 2016; Loughlin 2017), 
the EU institutions have been significant players ever since the country’s EU accession 
in the early 1980s. Besides, during the Greek sovereign debt crisis, ad-hoc institutions 
like the troika, namely the European Commission (EC), the European Central Bank (ECB) 
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and, recently, the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM) have led the drafting, negotiation and supervision of all Greek bailout 
programmes.    
Given this novel institutional mix, I argue that a de facto change of the Hellenic 
constitution may have taken place under the pressure of economic emergency and the 
development of new decision-making dynamics within the crisis-hit state. Both external 
and internal players have been the drivers of this change. The crisis seems to have 
magnified pre-existing dynamics in legislative and judicial activity. In this sense, the crisis 
could be seen as a series of transformative ‘constitutional moments’ (Ackerman, 1998), 
which have changed the interpretation, the application and normativity of the 
constitution.   
We shall attempt to see how the internal drivers of this change – being the parliament, 
the courts and the people- have reacted under the pressure of economic emergency, 
and what their actions, seen within the timeframe of nearly a decade of bailouts, may 
signify. Rather than offering an exhaustive account of the legislation or the case law of 
the crisis period, this paper aims to highlight trends born during this period, 
systematising them, if possible, and seeking answers for them. Has the crisis been the 
cause or merely the trigger of this change? Has this change been more permanent than 
temporary? In what sense? 
 
3. Triggering Change: The Memoranda of Understanding  
Greece’s record of institutional weaknesses had been well-known. In 2009, Greece 
suffered from a severe combination of two kinds of crises: sovereign debt and a large 
budget deficit. In 2010, the year of its first bail-out, Greek public debt amounted to 145% 
of its GDP, only to rise to over 180% of its GDP within seven years4. Several erroneous 
policies of the past and the state’s persistent failure or resistance to modernize 
(Tsoukalis 2016; Pelagides & Mitsopoulos 2016) contributed to reaching that critical 
point. Greece thus had to resort, like other countries of the Eurozone periphery, to 
external funding for its needs. Without early debt restructuring  – the ‘original sin’ of the 
crisis (Orphanides 2015) and a sign of the IMF’s submission to European pressures 
(Blustein 2016)- and assuming the costs of delaying it (Xafa 2014), Greek public debt has 
become literally unsustainable (Zettelmeyer 2017; Raffer 2017). Moreover, the 
country’s recovery and return to growth remains uncertain (Pagoulatos 2018), despite 
its recent ‘exit’ from its third financial assistance programme in August 2018. As well 
                                                     
3 See article 28.3 of the Greek Constitution, which provides the constitutional foundation for the 
participation of the country in the European integration process.  
4 Source: Eurostat (last updated October 26, 2017)  
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pointed out (Xafa 2018), a mere succession of bailouts, without significant regulatory, 
judiciary and tax reform progress, and in defiance of any optimistic projections, has 
turned out not to be the pill for Greece’s chronic illnesses.    
To overcome its financial hardship, Greece requested financial assistance in the form of 
bailouts. During 2010-2018, Greece underwent three consecutive economic adjustment 
programmes, signing three Memoranda of Understanding (‘MoUs’)5 with its creditors 
(EC/ECB/IMF) (‘the Troika’) and the ESM, in exchange of loans of over €300 billion in 
total. All loan agreements were conditional on the implementation of reforms and 
austerity measures. However, the conditionality imposed was often unrealistic in terms 
of targets and time frames. Each programme turned out more realistic than its 
predecessor (Pagoulatos 2018).  
External conditionality has been hailed as a ‘mega policy instrument’ (Spanou 2016). 
Empirically speaking, conditionality has one significant political advantage: governments 
from any side of the political spectrum have made use of the external force as a 
scapegoat to pass rather unpopular measures that would have otherwise been 
unthinkable (Moury and Standring 2017, Pagoulatos 2013). The reform capacity of policy 
conditionality per se is debatable, though. Domestic dynamics, namely the political 
system, governance processes and its deficiencies, are crucial for the successful 
implementation of external policy change (Spanou 2016). Without focus and 
prioritisation, external conditionality may fail in its domestic implementation. While the 
MoUs have been a major catalyst for policy change, the Greek society, for numerous 
historical reasons and contrary to what the elites supported, has been to a certain extent 
resistant to externally imposed reform- even more so, to ‘Europeanisation’ (Tsoukalis 
2016; Dertilis 2018). The very process of internationalisation and Europeanisation of the 
Greek state has never been straightforward or completed, after all (Ioannidis and 
Koutnatzis 2017). After years of accumulated sins and sovereign debt, Greece has 
entered a long period of forced adjustment through successive bailout programmes, the 
long-term impact of which still remains rather uncertain.  
The question is how three main players, namely the parliament, the courts and the 
Greek people, have responded to the MoUs, how they treated externally imposed 
change, and, ultimately, whether their reactions were well justified, drastic and even 
long-term.   
 
4. Three Drivers of Constitutional Change in Crisis-hit Greece  
4.1 The Parliament: Parliamentary Distortions after the Memoranda 
Greece’s entry into the period of fiscal adjustment, the so-called ‘Memoranda era’ 
signified a new reality for the country. All three Memoranda of Understanding shared 
                                                     
5 Specifically, in May 2010, October 2011 and August 2015, for the loan of €110 billion, €130 billion and 
€85 billion respectively. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_debt_crisis (last visited July 4, 2018)   
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the same legal status. While their nature had been widely disputed, both nationally6 and 
internationally7, in Greece they were considered political (‘soft law’) not international 
agreements drafted essentially by the creditors -at least on their conditionality part- 
with the Greek government playing only a limited role (Papaconstantinou 2017). Due to 
their ‘soft –non-legally binding- law’ nature, the MoUs did not have to be ratified by the 
Greek Parliament with qualified majorities of 3/5 (180 out 300 MPs) as provided by 
article 28.2 of the Greek Constitution.  All Memoranda were initially decided on a 
multilateral basis between Greece and its creditors, and were later incorporated into 
Council Decisions obliging Greece to implement several austerity measures8 through 
national legislation9. Hence it was only the measures implementing the MoUs, through 
national legislation, not the MoUs per se, as political agreements, which could be 
judicially reviewed.    
This new wave of ‘austerity legislation’ also sparked a novel parliamentary practice. 
Given their legal status as soft law agreements, the MoUs did not require ratification 
with qualified majorities -as international agreements do under the Greek Constitution- 
but could be embedded into the national legal order with very little democratic 
deliberation. While retaining the power to propose bills, the Greek government was 
mandated to find ways to implement the commitments made in the MoUs, under the 
final approval of the Troika10. Thus, the Greek parliament gradually acquired a more or 
less ratifying or executive role. Even before the crisis, though, parliaments had 
increasingly become marginalised (Papadopoulos 2013). That should have been 
expected, though, since nowadays state power is steadily diffused to spheres beyond 
the state, national or supranational, including to private bodies (Napolitano 2013). 
These trends were merely magnified during the crisis, through the exaggeration and 
steady legislative abuse of emergency (Venizelos 2018).  
Economic emergency has had a major impact on regulation. Legislating gradually 
became an act of survival, losing its value and significance. The steady resort to 
emergency legislative procedures dictated choices regularly divesting the parliament of 
valuable time for discussion. While originally a forum of deliberation, and despite its 
operational issues that predated the crisis, the parliament’s mission was altered to 
satisfy troika demands and impossible deadlines. Emergency legislative procedures 
                                                     
6 See the seminal decision of the Council of State, Decision 668/2012 (plenary session) (concerning the 
constitutionality of measures of Law 3845/2010 implementing the First Memorandum in Greece). 
However, a minority of the court supported the view that the MoU was an international agreement (§§27-
8).  
7 See the recent landmark Florescu case, where the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) for the first time 
acknowledged the legal status of the MoUs as ‘acts of EU institutions’, Case C-258/14, Eugenia Florescu 
and Others v. Casa Judet, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 13 June 2017, EU:C:2017:448.  
8 See eg, Council Decisions 2010/320/EU, [2010] OJ L 145/6 and 2015/1411/EU, [2015] OJ L 219/12   
9 See eg, Law 3845/2010 on Mechanisms to implement the support of the Greek Economy from the 
Eurozone members and the IMF (1st MoU), Law 4046/2012 on the approval of the draft convention of 
economic assistance between the EFSF, the Hellenic Republic and the Bank of Greece (2nd MoU), Law 
4336/2015 (3rd MoU) on pension provisions and the Ratification of the Draft Agreement on the Financial 
Assistance by the European Stability Mechanism (E.S.M) regarding the implementation of the Financing 
Agreement  
10 Papaconstantinou G., Interview, id (‘in practice, we may have had the pen to draft bills but lacked 
discretion. As the time went by, distrust grew bigger- the Troika often asked us to see draft bills in 
advance’)   
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slowly became the norm rather than the exception, often for reasons of political 
expediency, to ensure compliance with political commitments made. Consequently, the 
very procedure of legislating the Memoranda turned gradually into ‘a vote of confidence 
for the Government’ (Papaconstantinou 2017). Parliamentary voting of memoranda 
bills, as rapid as it was, signaled an endorsement both of the austerity programmes per 
se and of the government promoting them.   
At the same time, the Parliament has systematically abused other procedures too. 
Firstly, the submission of various last-minute law amendments11, which often surpassed 
in number the articles of a draft bill12, or the fast-track procedure13, or voting hundreds 
of pages of bills drafted in a single article14, to easily pass measures that could not 
withstand parliamentary review. Moreover, another common practice developed 
during the crisis has been the adoption of multi-themed bills (πολυνομοσχέδια) that 
challenged the principle of specification of laws15, piling legislative material from 
multiple ministries into a single bill16.  
In general, most –if not all— of the bills implementing the Memoranda were discussed 
and voted in an unorthodox fashion, in one sitting, often under conditions that tested 
human resilience (Gerontas 2010). Any disagreement with the measures often resulted 
in the MPs’ dismissal from their party17, raising further questions about internal party 
democracy in Greece. Moreover, the aforementioned legislative distortions, as well as 
any other errors within the legislative procedure, cannot be challenged at court in 
Greece, since they are considered interna corporis of the parliament, so not subject to 
judicial review.      
The finest other example of parliamentary distortions during the crisis is the 
phenomenal rise of legislative decrees (πράξεις νομοθετικού περιεχομένου). By abusing 
an exceptional clause (Article 44.1 of the Greek Constitution) that allows the executive 
power (the cabinet) to legislate only ‘under extraordinary circumstances of an urgent 
and unforeseeable need’, every government since 2010 has massively issued legislative 
decrees to legislate anything, from emergency measures to law amendments 
(Gerapetritis 2012a). During the first seven years of the crisis, decrees have been 
generally multiplied over five times, with the latest coalition government hailed the 
champions (Sotiropoulos and Christopoulos 2017). Since legislative decrees are 
considered special laws, once ratified by the parliament, they formally have equal status 
with the laws issued by the parliament, while they are issued much more easily.  
Hence the resort to legislative decrees was not random. The clear advantage behind the 
legislative decrees was that the executive could bypass ordinary ‘lengthy’ procedures 
and the parliament with ‘fast track’ legislation often without satisfying the emergency 
                                                     
11 See, eg, Νομοσχέδια εξπρές, άσχετες τροπολογίες στη σκιά της αβεβαιότητας, Kathimerini, June 2, 2017 
12 Article 74.5 of the Greek Constitution 
13 Article 76.4 of the Greek Constitution 
14 See, eg, Laws 3985/2012 and 4093/2012  
15 Enshrined under Article 74.5 of the Greek Constitution 
16 See, eg Laws 4320/2015 (A’29), 4350/2015 (A’161) and 4425/2016 (A’181).   
17 See, eg the dismissal of 45 MPs by their respective party leaders after voting against their party lines 
favoring the 2nd MoU: ‘Yes to the Memorandum by 199 MPS, no by 74’, Το Vima, February 12, 2012.  
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conditions. Since the latter is considered a political question not subject to judicial 
review18, the abuse of this practice has significantly empowered the executive, with the 
government discovering a leeway to act literally unbound. Using emergency as a pretext, 
every government has discovered a manner to legislate everything, beyond its 
commitments made under the memoranda, bypassing the parliament. Moreover, 
legislative decrees would only be ratified by the parliament within three months of their 
submission, having already produced their legal effects. Given the institutional 
imbalances caused by this abusive practice, there is an imperative need for judicial 
review, even limited, of legislative decrees. Notably, since this abusive practice 
undermines the normative power of the Constitution.     
Much of the austerity legislation was passed through these emergency procedures. Such 
normalisation of exceptional procedures or the circumvention and/or distortion of 
fundamental rules of the legislative procedure, which was magnified during the crisis 
period, has had an adverse impact on the quality of legislation and has seriously 
distorted and devalued the Hellenic parliament’s role within the established separation 
of powers system (Sotiropoulos and Christopoulos 2017; Papaconstantinou 2017)19. On 
the contrary, since state power often tends to flow towards the executive in 
emergencies (Scheppele 2010; Greene 2015) dynamics have tilted towards the 
government. Under strong troika pressures, it has been significantly empowered during 
the crisis, while left virtually unfettered from parliamentary controls. By abusing the 
notion of emergency, often for reasons of political expediency, governments have been 
hailed de facto as the ultimate decision-makers during the crisis years in Greece, 
regardless of the ruling party or coalition.  
It is imperative thus to restore checks and balances in order to combat the establishment 
of a majoritarian parliamentary system that undermines state institutions and the 
normative power of the constitution on the long run. Expanding the scope of judicial 
review of constitutionality to the interna corporis of the parliament (Gerapetritis 2012b) 
might provide a good safeguard against parliamentary arbitrariness. The tough 
challenge for parliaments remains how to restore institutional dynamics to healthy 
levels, before the wave of ‘parliamentary de-construction’ in the crisis (Marketou 2017) 
becomes endemic.   
 
4.2 The Courts: Judicial Asymmetries and Judicial Review during the Crisis 
Courts, particularly the highest ones, have been important drivers of change during the 
crisis. The so-called ‘crisis litigation’ gave rise to a significant body of case law that 
challenged the constitutionality of a variety of austerity measures, notably in the fields 
of social and tax policy. As a result, a critical mass of political decisions borne by the 
three Memoranda was ultimately judicialised, a trend rather expected (Papadopoulos 
2013), empowering justices, particularly of the highest courts, to exercise their vested 
                                                     
18 See, eg, Council of State (plenary session), Decision 2291/2015 (ruling that the satisfaction of emergency 
conditions under article 44.1 of the Constitution is ‘a political question not subject to judicial review’).  
19 See, eg, a legislative decree (Government Gazette No. A’224/12.11.2012), published the same day as 
Law 4093/2012 implementing the Second MoU, which illegally modified the provisions of Law 4093/2012!  
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powers of constitutionality review during the financial crisis. Nevertheless, courts have 
reacted diversely to austerity policies and measures throughout the crisis period. While 
being more deferential during the spark of the crisis, they became much more activist 
later on.  
Throughout the crisis period, spanning over eight years, austerity case law has in fact 
been rather diverse and asymmetric (Tsiftsoglou and Koutnatzis 2017). That could 
certainly be attributed to numerous factors. Firstly, to systemic factors, namely the fact 
that Greece lacks a constitutional court, unlike the majority of other European countries. 
Thus, due to its diffuse and incidental control system, constitutionality review of the 
austerity measures in different policy areas would be fragmented (Venizelos 2016), with 
some decisions even jeopardizing the long-term sustainability of programmes of fiscal 
adjustment. Secondly, the emergency factor has played out differently in judicial review, 
depending on the timing of the cases. If we attempted to draw a rough periodisation of 
crisis case law, particularly of the Council of State case law, we could distinguish two 
periods. A first one (spanning from 2010 and the first bailout programme to 2014- the 
year of the first ‘activist’ court decisions20), where justices were highly alert of the 
predicament of financial collapse and passively sided with the legislator (Vlachopoulos 
2014); and a second (post-2014 to present) more ‘activist’ one, when justices considered 
that the dangers of economic collapse had rather subsided and, to a large extent -though 
not completely- displayed greater activism (Simantiras 2018). Thirdly, the composition 
of the courts, particularly of the Council of State was influential. During the eight years 
of the crisis, the Council of State had six different presidents, each led by his own judicial 
philosophy, following a different jurisprudential approach and lines.    
The phenomenon of asymmetries could help describe Greek crisis case-law overall. The 
incidental review of constitutionality, together with the timing of the cases, the different 
presidencies of the courts, the nature of the disputes (tax or social policy measures, 
special21 or regular payroll cuts etc.) contributed to the creation of jurisprudence where 
the Council of State, in particular, took various stances. At times it affirmed triumphantly 
the constitutionality of certain measures, while at other times it annulled them, ignoring 
the fiscal effects of its decisions. Other times, conscious of such effects, it limited the 
effects of its decisions for the future22, not retroactively. On the long run, though, the 
Council of State developed a body of case law that approached the Memoranda 
realistically and responsibly, applying stricter scrutiny in the later stages of the crisis.  
The very position of the courts, especially highest ones, has been a true balancing act 
during the crisis. On the one hand, justices were bound by the limits of judicial review. 
Thus, constitutionality review could not turn into a blunt challenge of austerity policies 
made by the democratically-elected legislator, or even a substitution of his choices 
(Koutnatzis 2005). Undoubtedly, courts lack both the legitimacy and the knowledge to 
                                                     
20 See, eg, Council of State, Plenary Session Decisions 2192-96/2014 (concerning salary cuts in the armed 
forces), 4741/2014 (concerning salary cuts of university professors)  
21 See, eg, Council of State, Decisions 2192-6/2014 (armed forces), 4741/2014 (university professors); 
431/2018 (doctors in the public sector); Court of Audit, Decisions 4327/2014 and 1509/2016 (judges), 
4707/2015 (armed forces), 7412/2015 (doctors), 1506/2016 (university professors).   
22 See, eg, Council of State, Decisions 4741/2014 (professors) and 2287/2015 (pension cuts in the public 
sector) 
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make state budget decisions, even more so as demanded by the ‘constitutional law of a 
disorderly default’ (Venizelos 2016). On the other hand, while bound by the limits of 
constitutionality review and the exigencies of economic emergency, courts should 
perform a substantial review of austerity measures, particularly their justification 
(Iliopoulos-Strangas J. 2018). Such a check, as performed by the Council of State at the 
later stages of the crisis, has been rather novel and beneficial (Simantiras 2018). 
Procedure mattered, as much as substance, in legislating the measures, and severe 
austerity policies had to be properly justified. Furthermore, the emphasis on procedure 
inter alia signified the adoption of higher standards particularly in proportionality 
review, signifying a departure from the leniency of the past.  
Different levels of scrutiny were applied by the Council of State during the crisis. 
Originally, in the first period (2010-2014), when the court was called to review austerity 
measures in the context of the first and partially the second bailout programmes, it 
exercised self-restraint. Economic emergency dictated full-scale compliance with 
austerity policies, primarily affecting social rights, but with respect to fundamental rights 
and principles like equality and proportionality. As soon as the MoUs were implemented 
into national law23, litigation targeting austerity measures gave rise to a stream of crisis 
case law.  
Two plenary decisions of the Council of State are emblematic of this first period24. With 
its seminal ‘first MoU’ case (2012), concerning the constitutionality of the measures 
implementing the first MoU in the Greek legal order, the Court emphasised that the 
measures constituted part of a large-scale fiscal adjustment programme, imposed due 
to the emergency, subject only to marginal review. Hence it recognised a wide margin 
of discretion to the legislator, and ruled that there was no breach of the rights to 
property, equality or proportionality. The Council of State demonstrated remarkable 
self-restraint also in the famous PSI (Private Sector Involvement) cases (2014) 
concerning the compulsory exchange of Greek bonds with new – significantly devalued 
(‘haircut’) – ones, imposed against private sector bondholders, in the framework of 
radically reducing public debt. Property losses amounting up to 50% or more of capital 
were considered by the Court perfectly proportional, under the exceptional 
circumstances mandating their imposition. Furthermore, the Court ruled that, besides 
no property rights violation, there was no equality violation either, by the equal 
treatment of small bondholders and big investors.   
In its second, more activist judicial period (2014-present), the Council of State has 
acquired a more proactive role when reviewing austerity measures. Four years after the 
spark of the crisis, the successive effect of austerity measures has led justices to 
conclude that the political branches had overstepped their boundaries with regard to 
measures targeting state expenditures like salary and pension cuts and intensified their 
review. However, such activism was directed almost exclusively toward state 
                                                     
23 See in particular Law 3845/2010 implementing the first MoU (2010), and Laws 4046 and 4093/2012 
implementing the second MoU (2012), imposing large-scale salary and pension cuts in the public sector.   
24 Council of State, Decisions 668/2012 (‘the first MoU case’) and 1116-1117/2014 (‘the PSI cases’)   
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expenditures, leaving intact tax measures25 throughout the crisis period, intervening 
solely on peripheral26 issues. This approach was untenable on constitutional grounds 
however. Proportionality review should have been applied equally to both kinds of 
austerity measures and across different special payrolls in the public sector, but with 
respect to their constitutionally assigned roles.  
In proportionality review, the very notion and application of ‘fiscal public interest’ has 
been transformed during the crisis. In the first years of the crisis, courts -particularly the 
Council of State and the Special High Court – have regularly utilised it in creative ways27 
so as to legitimise excessive measures, inter alia restrictions on social rights (Pavlopoulos 
2014). Fiscal consolidation and the immediate aversion of financial collapse often 
constituted a ‘major national interest’ that justified serious human rights 
interferences28. Nevertheless, when courts became intensified their review later on, 
they were rather reluctant to use this legal term in order to justify disproportionate 
restrictions on social and other rights29. 
In one of the most activist decisions of its later period that concerned pension cuts in 
the public sector30, the Council of State held that such successive cuts were 
unconstitutional. Particularly, the Court gave emphasis both to the timing of the 
measures, which were imposed after the imminent danger of financial collapse had, in 
the Court’s view, subsided, as well as primarily to the proper justification of the 
measures. The Court considered that due to their intensity such successive measures 
ought to have been justified by a thorough actuarial report attached to the body of the 
bill, to aid justices in proportionality review. Similar reasoning can be found also in a 
recent case concerning the abolition of certain allowances in the public sector31, as well 
as in lower court decisions on pension cuts32.  
By comparison, the Portuguese crisis case-law might be exemplary. Throughout the 
financial crisis, the Portuguese Constitutional Court has also exhibited intense activism 
and less lenient standards of review overall (Guerra-Martins 2015; Kilpatrick 2017) when 
reviewing the austerity measures during the Portuguese bailout period, attracting harsh 
criticism for its decisions. While recognizing a wide discretion to the legislator in times 
of crisis, the Court applied strict scrutiny by relying on basic constitutional principles, 
namely equality or legal certainty, rather than social rights (Canotilho, Violante and 
                                                     
25 See, eg, Council of State, Decisions 1972/2012 and 532/2015 (property tax), 2527/2013 (annual 
contribution imposed on the self-employed and professionals), 2563/2015 (special solidarity contribution 
for high incomes) 
26 See, eg, Council of State, Decisions 4003/2014 and 4446/2015 (real estate price adjustments) 
27 For example, Special High Court, Decision 25/2012, §10 (‘the need to protect fiscal balance…’), Council 
of State, Decision 668/2012, §35 (‘…the measures aim to cover the immediate financial needs of the 
country and to restore the future fiscal and financial situation, meaning targets that constitute serious 
purposes of public interest and, at the same time, purposes of mutual interest to the Eurozone states’).  
28 See, eg, Council of State, Decisions 693/2011 and 1620/2011 
29 See, eg, Council of State, Decisions 2307/2014 and 2192/2014    
30 Council of State (Plenary Session), Decision 2287/2015, particularly §§ 7, 24  
31 Council of State (6th Section), Decision 2526/2018 (plenary decision pending)  
32 See, eg, ΜονΔιοικΠρωτΘες 3037/2018 and ΜονΔιοικΠρΑθ 9117/2018 
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Lanceiro 2015)33. In this way, it surpassed several obstacles inherent in their judicial 
protection -like state budgetary constraints- during the crisis and pronounced several 
norms unconstitutional. Furthermore, this strategy has helped to accommodate both 
critics and conflicting judges’ views and to develop a more coherent ‘crisis 
jurisprudence’ overall (Guerra-Martins 2015).  
Meanwhile, in Greece the issue of judicial salaries has been a controversial one during 
the crisis. Over the years, the judiciary had gradually become a ‘state within a state’ 
through the expansive interpretation of judicial guarantees of personal and functional 
independence34. Through a series of decisions issued by a special court (‘μισθοδικείο’)35 
the judges have managed, even during the crisis, to keep their salaries to pre-crisis 
levels36. Based on the premise that judges enjoy a special – preferential – status and, 
thus, salary/pension treatment, even among other special payrolls in the public sector, 
they have successfully challenged the constitutionality of all their salary and pension 
reductions, including retroactive ones. Moreover, compared to their foreign -like 
Cypriot37- counterparts, that had faced similar challenges due to the financial crisis, 
Greek justices essentially overstepped their role: while declaring the unconstitutionality 
of their pay and salary cuts, including retroactive ones, the Special Court further 
mandated that judicial salaries returned to pre-crisis levels, while denying any 
substitution of the legislator38. Nevertheless, justices had managed to successively raise 
their salaries over the years through creative constitutional interpretation39. 
Interestingly, the Greek constitution per se does not mandate a specific salary or 
pension level for judges. Hence any cuts that respected the principle of proportionality 
should have been pronounced as constitutional. Besides, successive austerity measures 
were applied horizontally across the public sector, including all special payrolls enjoying 
special salary treatment under the constitution as well. Judicial review of these 
measures should have been subject only to marginal review40.   
While such judicial asymmetries were dominant throughout the crisis period in Greece, 
the so-called crisis litigation at supranational courts turned out rather unsuccessful. Both 
                                                     
33 See, eg, Portuguese Constitutional Court Decisions 396/2011 (State Budget 2011), 353/2012 (State 
Budget 2012), 187/2013 (State Budget 2013), 862/2013 (Pension Convergence), 574/2014 (Pay Cuts 2014 
- 18)  
34 Enshrined particularly in articles 87§1 and 88§2, in combination with article 26 of the Greek Constitution  
35 According to the combination of articles 88.2 and 99 of the Greek Constitution, a Special Court 
(‘μισθοδικείο’), composed equally by 3 judges, 3 law professors and 3 senior attorneys, is competent to 
decide on all matters related to the remuneration and pensions of judges, provided that the resolution of 
the relevant legal issues may affect the salary, pension or fiscal status of a wider circle of persons.  
36 Special Court (‘Μισθοδικείο’), see Decisions 88/2013, 127/2016 and 1/2018. See also Court of Audit, 
Decision 4327/2014 (Plenary Session) ruling that pension cuts imposed on judges were contrary to the 
principles of equality (4), proportionality (25) and the right to property (1 First Protocol ECHR).  
37 See High Court of Cyprus, Fylaktou v. Democracy of Cyprus, Case No 397/12, Judgment of June 14, 2013, 
which ruled that pay and salary cuts of Cypriot justices were unconstitutional. Interestingly, judges took 
the initiative to voluntarily have their pay cut during the three years of the Cypriot crisis (2013-16).  
38 Despite a minority of the court suggesting otherwise, convincingly enough. See the minority opinion of 
Professor P.Spyropoulos in Decision 88/2013, claiming correctly that only the legislator, not the courts, 
can modify judicial salaries through legislation, always bound by constitutional principles.   
39 See the minority opinion of Professors N.Alivizatos and I.Konidaris in Decision 127/2016  
40 See especially the minority opinion of Justice I.Sarmas in Court of Audit Decision 4327/2014, as well as 
the minority opinion of Vice-President A.Rantos et al in Council of State Decision 4741/2014, §24.  
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the European Court of Human Rights41 and the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU)42 have 
recognised a wide margin of appreciation or discretion to national authorities in the 
crisis and have either deferred to them or declined to review austerity measures 
altogether. Breach of property right claims have been particularly unsuccessful, in the 
context of salary and pension cuts, due to the fact that the Strasbourg Court does not 
recognise a right to ‘sufficient’ salary or pension of established subsistence level. In fact, 
the legislator is free to adjust salaries and pensions as fit as long as he respects the 
principle of proportionality.  However, this wide judicial deference, exercised 
particularly by the Strasbourg Court in the context of fiscal and social policy, cannot be 
legally justified (Iliopoulos-Strangas J. 2018), when compared to other policy areas when 
the Court has certainly been more activist.   Moreover, such mainstream judicial 
deference has been a rather typical trend throughout the Euro crisis, signaling a deficit 
of judicial review particularly of the acts of EU institutions in the framework of financial 
assistance programmes (Tuori and Tuori 2014; Hinarejos 2015). The very applicability of 
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights has been questioned during the Euro crisis 
(Iliopoulos-Strangas J. 2018; Poulou 2017), with domestic – particularly Greek and 
Portuguese – courts systematically avoiding any ‘undesired EU judicialisation of the 
conflict’ (Kilpatrick 2017) between the MoUs and fundamental rights during the Euro 
crisis. National -rather than international- human rights standards, thus, finally 
prevailed. Ultimately, national rather than supranational judicialisation had an impact 
on these cases.     
 
4.3 The People: Democratic Fallacies and Populist Constitutionalism 
The Euro crisis period in Greece, as in several other European countries, saw the quick 
rise of populism and its constitutional equivalent, populist constitutionalism. Essentially, 
populism is the ‘negation of constitutional and representative democracy’ (Blokker 
2017; Venizelos 2018). It is the rejection of constitutional order, as we know it, of state 
institutions and the rule of law. Populists tend to self-construct the ‘people’ and their 
will -as well as their ‘enemies’- and to claim it as exclusively their own (Müller 2016; 
Sotiropoulos 2018). Constitutionalism is treated by populists over-critically or in a rather 
opportunistic manner (Blokker 2017). Frequently, they curb established democratic 
processes and institutions as tactics and tools to serve their own agenda. As pointed out 
(Müller 2016), such seemingly democratic engagements, may turn out not to be ‘a path 
to more political participation’.   
In this framework, the Greek people per se have been tested as drivers of change during 
the crisis through general elections, a referendum and the process of constitutional 
revision. Regarding elections, the double general elections of 2012 and particularly of 
2015 signified a major political backlash against the establishment, with the collapse of 
                                                     
41 ECHR, Koufaki & ADEDY v Greece, App.No 57665/12, Judgment of May 7, 2013 (concerning salary cuts 
in the public sector), ECHR, Mamatas et al v Greece, App.No 63066/14, Judgment of July 21, 2016 
(concerning the Private Sector Involvement ‘PSI’- Greek debt haircut - property damages suffered by 
bondholders)  
42 General Court of the EU, T-541/10 ADEDY v Commission & Council, ECLI:EU:T:2012:626, and Case T-
215/11 ADEDY v Commission & Council, Judgments of November 27, 2012, ECLI:EU:T:2012:627  
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long-held bipartisanism and the emergence of a left-led coalition to get the country out 
of the crisis43.  
Such major political change was quite unique in several aspects. Firstly, it did not happen 
in any other crisis-hit country in the Euro periphery, where respective governments -
with the prime examples of Portugal and Cyprus - took ownership of the bailout 
programmes and moved forward. On the contrary, in Greece there was lack of an initial 
public consensus over crisis management and a wide rejection of austerity from the very 
start. Moreover, general election results were not truly representative of the Greek 
electorate. In fact, there has been a drastic decline in voter turnout in elections during 
the crisis, indicating a relative backsliding of democracy in Greece (Sotiropoulos 2018). 
Lastly, this major political change, defying promises, did not signify an end to austerity 
in Greece. On the contrary, austerity has been successively adopted by every single 
government since 2010. Political realism drastically led to a reconfiguration of even 
radical anti-austerity narratives of the past.  
 The July 2015 referendum was a turning point in this regard. In late June 2015, and only 
a few months into the newly elected SYRIZA/ANEL government, critical negotiations 
with Greece’s creditors broke and Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras decided, to everyone’s 
surprise, to call a referendum. Proclaimed as a ‘negotiating tool’ against the creditors’ 
‘ultimatum’44, this controversial referendum called the Greek people to decide about 
the next steps ahead.  On the verge of the country’s collapse, this referendum really 
crossed the boundaries.  
It was a perilous move, one that disregarded history, culture and certainly the legal 
standards of referenda in Greece. Compared to other European countries, modern 
Greece certainly lacks both the history and a culture of referenda. Ever since the fall of 
the military dictatorship in 1974 and the establishment of the modern democracy, the 
political class had been reluctant to resort to direct democracy45, even more so in times 
of financial crisis46. Given its timing, procedure and context, this ‘bailout referendum’ 
marginally complied with the law or logic (Tsiliotis 2015; Contiades and Fotiadou 2016). 
Announced only a week in advance, this referendum deprived people of any significant 
time for reflection and debate.  Moreover, it was drafted in the least comprehensible 
manner with a vague, bizarre and misleading question addressed to the average voter, 
while it was premised on a troika proposal that was taken back within hours. 
                                                     
43 For the June 2012, the January 2015 and the September 2015 Greek general elections results see 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/June_2012_Greek_legislative_election,  
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/January_2015_Greek_legislative_election  
and https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/September_2015_Greek_legislative_election  
44 Greek PM Alexis Tsipras Calls Referendum on Bailout Terms, The Guardian, June 26, 2015 
45 The only other referendum of this modern era was the referendum on retaining the republic (Greek 
Republic Referendum) held in 1974, after the fall of the military regime, where the electorate voted 
categorically (almost 70%)  in favor. See 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greek_republic_referendum,_1974     
46 In October 2011, former PM George Papandreou’s idea to call a referendum on the terms of Greek debt 
haircut was met with outrage within and outside of Greece, leading up to his resignation.    
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Nevertheless, despite its serious legal misgivings, this referendum call was given the 
green light by the Council of State, as expected47.   
Besides, the July 2015 referendum was very risky. Under the looming fear of Grexit, the 
government was gambling with the creditors, shifting all the responsibility to its people. 
Ironically, instead of giving voice to the Greek people, this last-minute referendum 
turned into a political manipulation tool. It was a populist tactic, and a rather dangerous 
one, curbing a democratic process to advance the government’s agenda (Müller 2016). 
In a defining moment for Greece, PM Tsipras opted for the ‘non-solution of the 
Greferendum’ (Mudde 2017). While publicised as ‘a vote against austerity’ or ‘the troika 
establishment’, the 2015 referendum turned out to mislead people and to define the 
democratic paradox in the harshest way possible. When a state is on the verge of 
financial collapse, and it has failed to find any credible alternatives, democracy may be 
working only by name.   
 The promise of ‘an end to austerity’ evaporated fast. Only a week after the referendum, 
under a frenzied bank run and capital controls, and despite the vast majority voting for 
‘no’48, Tsipras defied this popular mandate and accepted a new, far stricter bailout deal 
with the creditors49. Such a wild U-turn, particularly given the PM’s record of criticism 
of his predecessors’ bailout negotiations, resulted into a big compromise. To everyone’s 
surprise, the new agreement, when trust had been lost totally with the Troika, entailed 
even harsher conditionality than the former programmes, in exchange for an €86 billion 
bailout (Blustein 2016). Moreover, it provided the establishment of an ultra-
privatisation fund, aimed to generate a total of €50billion over the course of the next 
decades through the monetisation of all public assets, only a small portion of which 
would be used for public investments, and more than half to finance the sovereign debt 
and recapitalise banks50.     
In addition to the 2015 bailout referendum, the result of which was brazenly defied, 
more populist initiatives have come up, in the context of the constitutional revision 
process. In early 2017, the present government launched a ‘social dialogue’ by 
appointing a crowdsourcing committee51 composed almost exclusively by non-
constitutional law experts. Essentially, the committee’s mission was to grasp popular 
attitudes about the present constitution and to generate proposals for its next revision. 
Despite any good intentions, this initiative rather circumvented the strict constitutional 
revision process (Venizelos 2018), which assigns the relevant initiative to the parliament 
alone52. The same goes for a former PM’s idea to suggest a referendum on the matter 
                                                     
47 Council of State (plenary session), Decision 2291/2015. Following its standard case-law, the Court held 
that governmental acts like the referendum call are considered political questions not subject to judicial 
review.  
48 In the July 6, 2015 ‘Greek Bailout’ referendum, over 60% (61, 31%) voted ‘no’, while 38,7% voted ‘yes’. 
See the full results, including turnout, at  
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greek_bailout_referendum,_2015  
49 Euro Summit Statement, Brussels, July 12, 2015 available at  http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/ 
50 See Euro Summit Statement, id, outlining the third bailout deal, after exhausting negotiations.    
51 For its mission, composition and activities see http://www.syntagma-dialogos.gov.gr/ (in Greek only)  
52 Article 110 of the Greek Constitution. Inter alia, this provision prescribes qualified majorities and time 
limits.  
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of constitutional revision (Pavlopoulos 2011)53. Notwithstanding the allure of direct 
popular engagement with the emblematic process of constitutional revision, the people 
were driven to circumvent the constitution. Moreover, the commencement of the 
constitutional revision process in this particular timing, the 2019 election year, where 
political tensions and polarisation are evident and the essential political consensus is 
absent, further attests to the true intentions of its architects. Much like the bailout 
referendum, the symbolic process of constitutional revision, with the expedient manner 
and the scale it has been recently initiated, has been used as yet another populist tactic 
ahead of the next general election.   
 
5. Conclusion 
After nearly a decade of bailouts, Three Memoranda and a major political change 
signifying a backlash to the old establishment, an exodus from the crisis remains unseen. 
The Memoranda themselves, despite their high ambitions, have not lived up to all their 
promises, each for different reasons. One could blame reform incapacity -a historical 
scourge of the Greek public administration (Dertilis 2018) as well as the unrealistic troika 
targets with the implementation of shock tactics rather unsuited to Greece (Simitis 
2017). On the one hand, the adjustment programmes were applied to the Greek public 
administration which, despite numerous reform efforts, still remains weak (Ioannidis 
and Koutnatzis 2017). On the other hand, the political class, regardless of the ruling 
party, has not substantially owned the programmes it implemented, always calculating 
the political cost. Meanwhile, the prevailing narrative against the Memoranda has 
gradually paralyzed the Greek society. Nevertheless, political change in Greece, however 
major and unique it may have been compared to other Euro crisis-hit states, did not 
signify any radical departure from the past. On the contrary, austerity policies were 
implemented by all successive crisis governments.  
The crisis narrative per se, prevalent in popular discourse and constitutional politics 
alike, has worked both ways. On the one hand, it has served to legitimise policies, 
legislation, and executive acts -in general, derogations from well-established norms- 
that would have been untenable on constitutional grounds. New norms have emerged, 
while older practices predating the crisis have been intensified and normalised in 
parliamentary review, that have gradually transformed the Parliament as an institution. 
However, such constitutional deregulation trends have spread also in other states 
during the Euro crisis, challenging the very normative power of constitutions 
(Yannakopoulos 2017).      
Courts, on the other hand, have responded rather asymmetrically to the crisis narrative.  
Judicial self-restraint has been instrumental, both on national and particularly on 
supranational levels, for the Euro crisis management. Nevertheless, while national 
                                                     
53Article 44.2 of the Greek Constitution provides only two types of referenda: a) a referendum on crucial 
national matters and b) a referendum on Bills passed by Parliament regulating important social matters, 
with the exception of the fiscal ones. Neither type can be used to revise the constitution, since 
constitutional revision is a process performed under the strict conditions enshrined in article 110 of the 
Greek Constitution.    
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courts displayed deference in the spark of the financial crisis, judicial scrutiny of 
austerity measures significantly intensified later on, notably targeting the justification 
of the measures. However, this shift was rather asymmetric, given the particulars of the 
system of constitutionality review in Greece, the nature of the cases, or the composition 
of the courts. Bound by their institutional limits, and aware of the fiscal impact of their 
decisions, some courts limited the effects of their annulling decisions, while others 
didn’t. Moreover, following other national high courts during the Euro crisis, the Council 
of State refrained to acknowledge any EU law links – and, therefore, any EU 
judicialisation of its matters- when reviewing the bailout measures. National human 
rights standards have thus prevailed in judicial review, as the crisis factor gradually 
deteriorated in judicial reasoning.   
Overall, the Greek crisis has gradually given rise to a new constitutional ethos, in the 
sense that the very perception of the constitution and its value among people has 
changed (Contiades and Tassopoulos 2013a). Clearly, this new ethos radiates well within 
the whole spectrum of civic life in Greece: from judicial interpretation to law 
enforcement, from regulation to the referenda and elections. The new constitutional 
ethos permeates and, thus, seriously undermines democracy, since it challenges the very 
normativity of the constitution. Moreover, the crisis has generated an era of populist 
constitutionalism that has poisoned constitutional politics, values and state institutions. 
Populist governments have steadily abused democratic processes and the constitution 
as a partisan instrument to promote their own agenda. Means of direct democracy like 
the referendum have been expediently used, only to be defied in the 11th hour of Grexit, 
while the rigid process of constitutional revision has been recently initiated in a manner 
and a timing that challenges its very symbolism.  
Finally, the Greek crisis, when viewed under the prism of the Euro crisis, has brought to 
light a hard ‘trilemma’: how to combine democracy with compliance and capability, all 
at the same time (Featherstone 2016; Eleftheriades 2014). Greece became another 
victim of the illnesses of a fundamentally-flawed monetary union that has hampered EU 
political unity and undermined European democracy, defying its founding founders’ 
aspirations. Catastrophic sovereign debt management during the Euro crisis has resulted 
to serious erosions of democracy. In the midst of collective problems that call for 
collective action, sovereignty needs to be re-conceptualised (Loughlin 2016). The Euro 
crisis has particularly highlighted this need, in the context of deeper European 
integration and risk management. Sovereignty, in the context of global challenges, only 
becomes a relative concept.  
The constitution as a legal and political instrument is vital for any democracy. A new 
‘constitutional patriotism’ (Venizelos 2018) is needed, meaning a new, reinvigorated 
relationship of citizens and state institutions with the Greek constitution. Furthermore, 
while the crisis deepens and emergency starts to fade, constitutional resilience is key. 
Restoring checks and balances, while protecting the sovereign from further erosions 
becomes a task and a challenge to protect Greece from a total state transformation.    
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